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Some of the most egregious restrictions 
and violations of human rights in Russia 
are often hidden behind a veil of formality. 
The Russian judicial system is usually 
consistent in giving recognition to 
fundamental human rights and freedoms; 
indeed the 1993 Russian Constitution is a 
progressive document that in many instances 
expands on rights found in the 
European Convention and strengthens the 
standard of protection to be applied to 
them. Nevertheless, Russian procedural 
law, which remains underdeveloped in 
fundamental areas such as case management, 
rules of evidence, and interlocutory 
remedies, all too often leaves the judicial 
system open to denial of fundamental 
rights – not as a matter of merit, but 
through manipulation of procedural lacunae. 
One of the challenges of the Russian 
advocate is to lift the veil of formality by 
exposing these flaws. 
This is particularly important in proceedings 
before the European Court of Human 
Rights, since the Court is typically concerned 
with the overall fairness of the 
proceedings, rather than with ‘mere’ procedural 
irregularities along the way. For 
this reason, a number of recent judgments 
issued by the European Court on issues of 
Russian domestic procedure are particularly 
welcome, in that they show the 
Court’s readiness to scrutinise this area of 
domestic law and practice. Interestingly, 
many of these judgments involve no separate 
issue of a breach of substantive rights. 
In Posokhov v. Russia1, the applicant, a 
customs officer, was convicted of abuse of 
office and of being an accessory to evasion 
of customs duties. It appears that the 
applicant was not detained at any point in 
the proceedings, and by the time the case 
came before the Court for a hearing on the 
merits, the conviction had been quashed 
and the case dismissed as time-barred 
without any adverse finding of guilt. 
Nevertheless, the applicant pursued his 
case before the European Court under 
Article 6 of the Convention on the 
grounds that the two lay judges who had 
participated in consideration of his case 
had not yet been officially appointed at 
the time of the proceedings. Despite the 
fact that the applicant’s conviction was 
eventually overturned, the Court found a 
violation of Article 6 on the basis that the 
composition of the convicting court was 
unlawful,which had never been acknowledged 
in the domestic proceedings. 
In Ryabykh v. Russia2, the applicant complained 
that a final domestic judgment 
awarding her compensation for savings 
devalued following economic reforms in 
1991 had been overturned through the supervisory 
review procedure. She alleged 
violations of Article 6 of the Convention 
and Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention. 
Here, the substance of the applicant’s 
claim (the loss of savings through devaluation) 
was not protected under the Convention, 
and in any event the Government 
eventually granted compensation to the 
applicant. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded 
to examine the case under Article 6 
as to the compatibility of the domestic supervisory 
review procedure with the Convention. 
Whilst the Court did not declare 
supervisory review incompatible per se, it 
found that its exercise to quash a final decision 
on anything less than “substantial 
and compelling” grounds offended the 
principal of ‘legal certainty’ inherent in 
Article 6. This effectively amounts to a 
condemnation of the wide discretion available 
to a court in supervisory review proceedings 
under domestic law. 
In Smirnova v. Russia3, the applicants, 
twin sisters convicted of fraud, were detained 
repeatedly as their cases proceeded 
to trial. The Court found a violation of 
Article 5(1) and 5(3) of the Convention in 
that the domestic courts did not offer sufficiently 
detailed reasons for their repeated 
detentions, but relied only upon the gravity 
of the crimes alleged. A violation of Article 
6 was also found as to the length of the 
proceedings, despite the fact that the applicants 
had repeatedly sought to evade the 
prosecution. The Court found that this too, 
was indirectly attributable to the authorities 
in that the “sparsely reasoned and recurring 
decisions to detain and release… 
aroused in [the applicants] a sense of insecurity 
and mistrust toward justice [and] 
thereby indirectly urg[ed] them to abscond”. 
Notably, the issues raised were 
once again essentially procedural4, as the 
applicants’ guilt was not in dispute before 
the Court and the periods of detention did 
not exceed the length of their final sentences. 
The case of Timofeyev v. Russia5 reaffirmed 
the Court’s earlier judgment in 
Burdov v. Russia6. These cases, which 
involved failure to enforce judgments in 
civil proceedings, are of use to the practitioner 
in that they demonstrate the State 
cannot evade its obligations under Article 
6 by simply enforcing a judgment once it 
is evident the matter will be heard by the 
European Court. Belated enforcement 
must be accompanied by an acknowledgment 
of the violation and ‘just satisfaction’ 
commensurate to the delay. 
The case of Rakevich v. Russia7 concerned 
the compatibility of compulsory placement 
in a mental hospital with the protection 
against arbitrary deprivation of liberty under 
Article 5 of the Convention. The Court 
found that the applicant’s detention in a 
mental hospital was not arbitrary given that 
the authorities’ decision was based on psychiatric 
evidence that she was mentally ill, 
and this was later affirmed by the domestic 
courts. Nevertheless, a violation of Article 
5(1) of the Convention was found given 
that her detention was reviewed by the 
court only thirty-nine days after her detention, 
as opposed to within five days as required 
by domestic law. A further violation 
of Article 5(4) was established in that 
the applicant had no procedural route to 
challenge the detention of her own accord, 
notwithstanding the fact that the institution 
itself was under a statutory duty to arrange 
for judicial sanction of her detention. 
Lack of an effective interlocutory remedy 
was also addressed in Kormacheva v. Russia8. 
Here, proceedings in an employment 
dispute involving the applicant lasted over 
six years, five of which were postratification 
of the Convention. Despite the 
existence of formal time-limits for consideration 
of civil proceedings under domestic 
law, the applicant could do little more than 
complain to the judge’s superiors when 
these were not observed. As a result, the 
Court established not only a violation of 
the ‘reasonable time’ requirement in Article 
6, but also a breach of Article 13 in that 
the applicant was unable to obtain preventative 
or compensatory relief for the delay. 
The progression of these cases before the 
Court has, to a degree, guided Russian 
legislators in their reform of Russia’s administrative, 
civil, commercial and criminal 
codes. Notably, the use of lay judges 
has been done away with in civil and 
criminal proceedings, and some of the 
flaws in Russia’s supervisory review procedure 
have been removed. More reform 
is needed, as well as effective remedies to 
ensure observance of existing rules. Nevertheless, 
the Court’s approach demonstrates 
that violations of domestic procedure, 
even ones that are relatively widespread 
and which may have not affected 
the ultimate outcome of the case, will be 
taken up by the European Court if they 
raise a legitimate issue under the Convention. 
In the domestic arena, these recent 
judgments also give Russian advocates a 
useful instrument to counteract attempts at 
manipulation of gaps in procedural rules to 
thwart their clients’ interests. 
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